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Trinity/Add.Ms.c/95 contains:
<-- See earlier
31 J.F. Payne to Henry Sidgwick
32 J.F. Payne to Henry Sidgwick
33 C.H. Pearson to Henry Sidgwick
34 C.H. Pearson to Henry Sidgwick
35 C.H. Pearson to Henry Sidgwick
36 A.P. Pease to Henry Sidgwick
37 Frank Podmore to Henry Sidgwick
38 Sir F. Pollock to Henry Sidgwick
39 Sir F. Pollock to Henry Sidgwick
40 Sir F. Pollock to Henry Sidgwick
41 R.H. Quick to Henry Sidgwick
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Additional Manuscripts c

Title A.P. Pease to Henry Sidgwick
Reference 95/36
Covering Dates n.d.
Extent and Medium 1 doc
Content and context

Writes in relation to certain aspects of Kant's philosophy. Decided to send in some questions, since the next lecture is to be the last lecture on Kant. In relation to the latter's arguments against suicide, he doesn't understand why they are not conclusive, and refers to the optimistic and pessimistic views of life in this regard. Annotation [in HS's hand]: 'I do not say that prohibition of suidide cannot be deduced from acceptance of perfection and happiness as [ ] ends, but that it cannot be deduced from fundamental Law.' Pease does not understand why benevolence 'does not follow as a duty from Kant's doctrine. Maintains that 'as [far] as such man acts rationally he is part of a universal whole [which] can only have one tendency - i.e. Towards Happiness. Asks if Kant would never allow that the end justifies the means, and suggests that he appears not to when he says "the moral worth of an action is 'without regard to any object of desire'". Believes that the test of duty should be applied to the action taken 'in connection with the intention', and asks if in this second proposition is Kant not assuming as elsewhere that society is in a stable condition.

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